13 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Several references to CIA appear in Marquis Childs's recently published book, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General and the President" (1958, Harcourt Brace), as follows:

a. Brief reference to Ferdinand Eberstadt's reorganization plans of 1945 which led to what later included the NSC, "served by the Central Intelligence Agency" (p. 95);

b. CIA's alleged intelligence reporting, November 1956, on Soviet missile capability against U.K. (p. 240); see excerpt, attached;

c. CIA's alleged intelligence reporting, 1957, on Soviet missile tests (p. 258); see excerpt, attached.

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STANLEY J. GROGAN
Assistant to the Director

cc: DDCI

Marquis Childs, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General and the President" (1958, Harcourt Brace, New York); Chapter 5, "Return of the Hero," p. 95.

"The Army's plan /for "consolidation/ called for a strict chain of command: a single, integrated Department of Defense under a single secretary, a chief of staff and General Staff for the Armed Forces, and three coequal components, air, ground, and sea, each with a commander. The core of the Navy's plan was a continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system inaugurated during the war, to be reinforced by other wartime co-ordinating mechanisms such as the Joint Research and Development Board and the Army-Navy Munitions Board. Co-ordination on basic policy was to be provided by the Joint Chiefs and by an over-all secretary of defense who would not, however, have administrative control over the services. The service departments, including, if the Army insisted, a separate Air Force, were to be autonomous and of cabinet rank. The Navy's views were presented in a report prepared in 1945 by Ferdinand Eberstadt at the direction of the then Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. The report envisioned on the highest level co-ordination of military, diplomatic, and economic policy through what were to emerge as the National Security Council, served by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board.

"From the first, the Navy had an advantage in the effectiveness of its presentation and, in addition, because its plan was far less radical than the sweeping reorganization advocated by the Army. The Army proposed, or so the Navy alleged through the secret propaganda bureau directed by Admirals Radford and Burke, to abolish some of the most cherished military institutions embodying the proudest American traditions. The existence of the Marine Corps in particular was believed to be threatened. ....."

Excerpt from Marquis Childs, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero" (1958); Chapter 11, "A State of Health," p. 240:

"On Election Day, November 6 [1956], events came to a wild climax. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has told how he was en route to his voting residence on Long Island to cast his ballot when a courier hastily dispatched from Washington overtook him. The word the courier brought was of Marshal Bulganin's notes of the day before to Britain and France which seemed to imply that the Soviet Union would use rocket weapons against them unless the invasion of Egypt was stopped immediately. Dulles turned around and flew back to Washington to spend what he has said was perhaps the most agitated and frantic twenty-four hours in his entire career. On the basis of thorough and intensive work by the C.I.A., Dulles had every reason to believe that the Soviet Union had launching bases in place capable of sending missiles with nuclear warheads in the direction of the European capitals up to a range of 1,500 miles. His agency had been plotting the trajectories of missiles since late in 1954. So the Bulganin threat was not an empty one. In high government offices in London and Paris, where there was also a relatively realistic appraisal of Soviet capabilities, something like panic prevailed."

Excerpt from Marquis Childs, "Eisenhower: Captive Hero" (1958); Chapter 12, "The Image Fades," p. 258:

"Looking back, the marvel is how totally unprepared we were for what was to happen next. Before October 4 [1957], our complacency, our comfortable conviction of inevitable superiority, was a suit of armor that nothing could penetrate. A warning of sorts had come earlier in the summer when reports were printed that American intelligence sources had verified the successful testing of a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of up to 5,000 miles. Not long afterward, the Soviets announced that they had perfected an operational ICBM. The fact was that the Central Intelligence Agency had known of these successful tests for many months. The information had been kept back, so it was said, to see when and how Moscow, in its own good time, would make known this great advance. Important as it was, signifying that Russia was at least two to three years ahead of the United States, the news created only a mild stir. One reason, of course, was that administration spokesmen in the Defense Department and elsewhere began to cast doubt on the report. This was in all probability no more than a test prototype of a long-range missile. From these first tests it would be a long was to an operational weapon. These were the comfortable words that came out of Washington, and so deeply ingrained was the assurance of superiority that it was easy to shrug off this latest claim by the boastful Russians."